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IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
I. Appealability 
1. Final Judgments 
(a) Except where a direct review may be had in the 
Supreme Court, ~ 28 u.s.c. § 1252 (appeals from decisions 
invalidating Acts of Congress where U.S. is a party), appeals 
from all final decisions of the District Courts must be 
prosecuted in the Courts of Appeals. 28 u.s.c. § 1291. 
(b) "The classic definition of a final decision is one 
which terminates the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing 
for the court to do but execute the judgment." 2 Fed. Proc. L. 
Ed. § 3:306. 
(c) The finality rule is designed to avoid fragmented 
litigation, which clogs the appellate courts and causes 
unnecessary delay in the trial courts. 
2. Partial F!nal Judgments 
(a) "When more than one claim for relief is presented 
in an action, ••• or when multiple parties are involved, the 
[District Court] may direct the entry of a final judgment as to 
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon 
an express determination that there is no just reason for delay 
and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment." Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 54(b). The judgment then is appealable. 
(b) The District Court must (1) indicate why there is 
no just reason for delay and (2) expressly direct the entry of 
partial judgment. This certification process is reviewed on an 
abuse of discretion standard. Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General 
Electric Co., 446 U.S. 1 (1980); Ansam Associates, Inc. v. Cola 
Petroleum, Ltd., 760 F.2d 442 (2d Cir. 1985) (District Court 
failed to provide sufficiently detailed explanation). 
3. Collateral Orders 
(a) A collateral order is appealable if it: (1) 
conclusively determines a disputed question; (2) resolves an 
important issue completely separate from, and collateral to, the 
merits of the case; and (3) is effectively unreviewable on appeal. 
Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 u.s. 541 (1949) 
(order waiving the posting of security for costs); ~ 
Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424 (1985) Corders 
disqualifying counsel are not collateral orders subject to 
appeal). 
(b) Denial of a public officer's claim of absolute 
immunity in an action brought under 42 u.s.c. § 1983 is 
appealable before final judgment. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 u.s. 
731 (1982); Minotti v. Lensink, 798 F.2d 607 (2d Cir. 1986). 
Denial of a claim of qualified immunity in a § 1983 action, to 
the extent it turns on an issue of law, likewise is appealable. 
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985). Cf. Group Health Inc. 
v. Blue Cross Ass'n, 793 F.2d 491, 497 (2d Cir. 1986) (immunity 
issues requiring resolution of factual questions). 
4. Interlocutory Orders 
(a) Interlocutory orders granting or denying 
injunctions; appointing receivers; and determining rights and 
liabilities in admiralty cases are appealable of right. 28 
u.s.c. § 1292(a). An order granting or refusing a stay of 
arbitration proceedings is not a grant or denial of an injunction. 
Greater Continental Corp. v. Schechter, 422 F.2d 1100, 1102 C2d 
Cir. 1970). (An order compelling or denying arbitration, 
however, is appealable as a final decision under § 1291. 15 
C.A. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3914, at 
553 n.45.) The grant or denial of a temporary restraining order 
is not appealable, except in very limited circumstances. 19 Fed. 
Proc. L. Ed. § 47:167. 
(b) Where a non-final order involves "a controlling 
question of law as to which there is substantial ground for 
difference of opinion" and "an immediate appeal from the order 
may materially advance the ultimate termination of the 
litigation," a District Judge may certify the order for 
interlocutory review, subject to acceptance by the Court of 
Appeals. 28 u.s.c. § 1292(b). The District Judge should give 
reasons for the certification and should state more than a bare 
finding that the statutory requirements have been met. Isra 
Fruit Ltd. v. Agrexco Agricultural Export Co., 804 F.2d 24 C2d 
Cir. 1986). 
(c) Although the extraordinary writs (certiorari, 
mandamus and prohibition), 28 u.s.c. § 1651 CAll Writs Act), are 
not to be used as substitutes for appeals, they may be invoked in 
exceptional circumstances to correct clearly erroneous rulings or 
to supervise procedural decisions of the trial judge to whom the 
writs are directed. 2 Fed. Proc. L. Ed. 3:367 et seg. 
(d) A Court of Appeals having jurisdiction over an 
appealable ruling may exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction 
over an otherwise non-appealable order. Port Authority Police 
Benevolent Ass'n v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey, 698 
F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1983) (denial of class certification, 
ordinarily unappealable, "inextricably related" to appealable 
denial of preliminary injunction). Acceptance of this 
jurisdiction is entirely discretionary. General Motors Corp. v. 
Gibson Chemical & Oil Corp., 786 F.2d 105 C2d Cir. 1986). 
(e) All orders denying intervention are appealable in 
the Second Circuit. Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 606 F.2d 354, 
357 (2d Cir. 1979). Cf. Hispanic Society v. New York City Police 
Department, 806 F.2d 1147 C2d Cir. 1986) (parties who did not 
seek to intervene in District Court lacked standing to prosecute 
appeal>. An order denying intervention as of right (Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 24(a)) and granting permissive intervention (Fed. R. Civ. P. 
24(b)) subject to conditions is not appealable. Stringfellow v. 
Concerned Neighbors In Action, 55 U.S.L.W. 4299 (U.S. Mar. 9, 
1987). 
5. Judgments Entered By Magistrates 
(a) If the parties consent to trial before a 
Magistrate, an appeal from a judgment entered at the direction of 
the Magistrate is heard by the Court of Appeals. 28 u.s.c. § 
636(c)(3); Fed. R. App. P. 3.1 (eff. July 1, 1986). 
(b) If the parties consent that the appeal of the 
Magistrate's judgment be taken to a Judge of the District Court, 
the District Court judgment is appealable only upon leave granted 
by the Court of Appeals in the exercise of discretion. 28 u.s.c. 
§ 636(c}(4), (5); Fed. R. App. P. 5.1 Ceff. July 1, 1986). 
6. District Court Judgments in Bankruptcy Matters 
(a) The District Courts have jurisdiction to hear 
appeals from final judgments, orders and decrees of the 
Bankruptcy Courts. They also may hear appeals from interlocutory 
orders and decrees by leave. 28 U.S.C. § 158(a), Bankr. R. 
800l(a), (b). 
(b) Appeals from the District Courts to the Courts of 
Appeals in bankruptcy matters are governed by the rule of 
finality. 28 u.s.c. § 158(d). Accordingly, a District Court's 
decision on an interlocutory matter in a bankruptcy proceeding 
generally is not a final judgment for purposes of appeal to the 
court of Appeals. In re Stable Mews Associates, 778 F.2d 121 (2d 
Cir. 1985) (District Court affirmance of interim award of 
compensation to Chapter 11 Trustee acting as his own attorney 
interlocutory in nature and not appealable). 
7. Agency and Tax Court Decisions 
(a) The appealability of an Agency decision is governed 
by the finality date rules established by the Agency. Western 
Union Telegraph Co. v. FCC, 773 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
(b) Courts of Appeals have jurisdiction to review the 
decisions of certain Agencies in connection with applications to 
enforce the orders of those Agencies (e.g., NLRB). Fed. R. App. 
P. 15(b). 
(c) Appeal from a Tax Court decision should await the 
entry of a formal document terminating the entire proceeding, and 
disposition as to less than all tax years at issue in one case is 
not appealable. Estate of Yaeger v. C.I.R., 801 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 
1986); Fed. R. App. P. 13. 
8. Post-Judgment Motions 
(a) Decisions on motions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 
(Relief from Judgment or Order) are separately appealable under 
an abuse of discretion standard. In re Emergency Beacon Corp., 
666 F.2d 754, 760 (2d Cir. 1981). Rule 60 allows the District 
Court to correct clerical errors arising from oversight or 
omission even after the judgment has been affirmed on appeal. 
Panama Processes, S.A. v. Cities Service Co., 789 F.2d 991 (2d 
Cir. 1986). 
(b) Timely motions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) 
(judgment n.o.v.), 52(b) (amendment of court's findings) and 59 
(new trial and amendment of judgment) stop the time for appeal 
from running, and no appeal may be taken until they are decided. 
See Fed. R. App. P. 4<a>C4); Rados v. Celotex Corp., 809 F.2d 170 
(2d Cir. 1987> (notice of appeal considered a nullity when motion 
for "reconsideration," treated as motion to amend judgment, was 
pending). 
II. Scope of Review 
1. Findings of Fact 
(a) Factual findings by the Court, whether based on 
oral or documentary evidence, may not be set aside unless they 
are clearly erroneous. Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a). A choice between 
two permissible views of the evidence cannot be clearly erroneous. 
Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 u.s. 564 (1985). 
(b) "[N]o fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise 
re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to 
the rules of the common law." u.s. Const. amend. VII. This 
provision is taken to mean that, where a motion for a judgment 
n.o.v. was not made, the appellate court can only affirm or 
remand for a new trial. 2 Fed. Proc. L. Ed. § 3:650. 
(i) A motion for judgment n.o.v. should be granted 
only where there is such a lack of evidence that (i) the verdict 
could have only been the result of sheer surmise or (ii> the 
evidence is so overwhelming that reasonable people could not have 
arrived at a verdict against the movant. Mallis v. Bankers Trust 
Co., 717 F.2d 683, 688-89 (2d Cir. 1983). Denial of the motion 
is reviewed in the Court of Appeals under the same standard. 
Lopez v. McLean Trucking Co., 798 F.2d 611 C2d Cir. 1986). 
(ii) The denial of a motion for a new trial is 
reviewed on an abuse of discretion standard, but "[t)o the extent 
that a new trial was sought on the ground that the verdict was 
against the weight of the evidence, [the Second Circuit] ha[s] 
disclaimed the authority to review a ruling on such a motion." 
Newmont Mines Ltd. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 127, 133 C2d 
Cir. 1986). 
2. Determinations of Law 
(a) "An appellate court can reverse the determination 
below for mere error in law, and does not apply the clearly 
erroneous standard in reviewing determinations of law." 2 Fed. 
Proc. L. Ed. § 3:652. 
(b) Errors and defects appearing in the record must be 
disregarded if they do not affect the substantial rights of the 
parties. 28 u.s.c. § 2111 Charmless error rule). Courts must 
refuse to disturb orders and judgments unless such refusal is 
"inconsistent with substantial justice." Fed. R. Civ. P. 61. 
(c) Admission or exclusion of evidence is not error 
unless a party's substantial rights are affected and (1) a 
specific objection is made in cases of admission or (2} an offer 
of proof is made in cases of exclusion. Fed. R. Evid. 103(a). 
(d) Giving or failing to give an instruction to a jury 
may not be assigned as error unless specific objection is made 
before the jury returns. Fed. R. Civ. P. 51. In the. rare 
instance, plain error in an instruction not objected to may be 
ground for reversal to prevent a miscarriage of justice. 
Williams v. City of New York, 508 F.2d 356, 362 (2d Cir. 1974). 
3. Administrative Agency Decisions 
(a) Depending upon the type of agency action involved, 
administrative agency fact-finding can be set aside as (1) 
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or not otherwise in 
accordance with law, 5 u.s.c. § 706(2)(A); (2) unsupported by 
substantial evidence, 5 u.s.c. § 706(2)(E); or (3) unwarranted by 
the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to a trial de 
novo by the reviewing court, 5 u.s.c. § 706(2)(F). 
(b) In reviewing administrative agency action, the 
reviewing court is charged with the duty of deciding all relevant 
guestions of law, interpreting constitutional and statutory 
provisions, and determining the meaning or applicability of the 
terms of agency action. 5 u.s.c. § 706. 
(c) Agency action violative of statutory provisions is 
not in accordance with law and will be set aside. Acemla v. 
Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 763 F.2d 101 (2d Cir. 1985). Cf. New 
York Council v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 757 F.2d 502 
(2d Cir. 1985) (expert tribunal generally entitled to deference 
in construing its Enabling Act). 
III. Mechanics of Appeal 
1. Notice of Appeal 
(a) Appeal as of right is taken by filing a notice of 
appeal in the District court. Fed. R. App. P. 3(a). The filing 
fee (currently $5) and the docketing fee (currently $65) are paid 
to the Clerk of the District Court, who serves notice of filing 
by mailing copies to counsel of record for each party other than 
appellant. The Clerk also transmits copies of the notice of 
appeal and the docket entries to the Clerk of the Court of 
Appeals. Fed. R. App. P. 3 (d) , (e) . 
(b) Notice of appeal as of right is filed within 30 
days (60 days if federal government is party) after the date of 
entry of the judgment or order appealed from. Fed. R. App. P. 
4Ca)(l). A final judgment is not entered until a separate 
document is filed. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6); see Kanematsu-Gosho, 
Ltd. v. M/T Messiniaki Aigli, 805 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1986). If a 
timely notice of appeal is filed by a party, any other party may 
file a notice of appeal within 14 days thereafter. Fed. R. App. 
P. 4(a)(3). 
(c) Upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause, 
the District Court may extend the time for filing a notice of 
appeal as of right. The motion to extend must be made within 30 
days after the expiration of the time prescribed for filing a 
notice of appeal, and the extension cannot exceed the later of 30 
days beyond such time or 10 days from the entry of the order 
granting the motion. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5); ~In re O.P.M. 
Leasing Services, Inc., 769 F.2d 911 C2d Cir. 1985) (extension 
denied for failure to show excusable neglect). 
(d) Leave to appeal from a certified interlocutory 
order (28 u.s.c. § 1292(b)) is sought by filing a petition with 
the Clerk of the Court of Appeals within 10 days after entry of 
the order in the District Court, with proof of service. If leave 
is granted, the necessary fees must be paid to the Clerk of the 
District Court within 10 days of the order granting leave, 
whereupon the appeal is docketed in the Court of Appeals. Fed. 
R. App. P. 5. The same procedure obtains with regard to 
permission to appeal from judgments entered upon direction of the 
Magistrate (28 u.s.c. § 636(c)(5)), except that the petition for 
leave must be filed within the time allowed for filing a notice 
of appeal as of right. Fed. R. App. P. 5.1. 
(e) A notice of appeal is filed with the Clerk of the 
United States Tax Court within 90 days after the Tax Court 
decision is rendered; if the notice is timely filed, any other 
party may file within 120 days after the decision. Fed. R. App. 
P. 13. A petition to review the order of an administrative 
agency is filed with the Clerk of the Court of Appeals within the 
time prescribed by the applicable statute. Fed. R. App. P. 15(a). 
An application for enforcement of an agency order also is filed 
with the Clerk of the Court of Appeals. Fed. R. App. P. 15(b). 
2. Record on Appeal 
(a) The record on appeal consists of the original 
papers and exhibits filed in the District Court, the transcript 
of proceedings, and a certified copy of the docket entries 
prepared by the Clerk of the District Court. Fed. R. App. P. 
lO(a). The transcript, or such part as appellant deems 
necessary, must be ordered from the Reporter within 10 days after 
the notice of appeal is filed. Fed. R. App. P. lO(b)(l). See 
CAMP R. 3. 
(b) Unless the entire transcript is included, appellant 
must file, within the 10-day period, a statement of issues to be 
presented on appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 10(b)(3). Where no 
transcript is available, appellant may prepare and serve a 
statement of the proceedings, subject to objection by the 
appellee and approval of the District Court. Fed. R. App. P. 
lO(c). 
(c) Any differences of the parties with respect to 
whether the record discloses what occurred in the District Court 
must be settled by the District Court. Also, the Court of 
Appeals may direct that omissions or misstatements be corrected 
and may order a supplemental record to be certified and 
transmitted. Fed. R. App. P. lO(e). 
(d) The court Reporter must furnish the transcript 
within 30 days after receipt of the order therefor and must 
request an extension from the Clerk of the Court of Appeals if 
necessary. Fed. R. App. P. ll(b). 
(e) Local Rule 11 urges the parties to agree as to the 
exhibits necessary for the determination of the appeal. Failing 
that, each party may designate the exhibits considered necessary, 
and all non-designated exhibits remain with the District Court 
Clerk unless requested by the Court of Appeals. The Rule does 
not relieve the parties of their obligations with respect to 
preparation of the Appendix. 
3. The Civil Appeals Management Plan (CAMP) 
(a) Within 10 days after filing the notice of appeal or 
petition for review or enforcement, the appellant or petitioner 
must file Form C or Form C-A (Civil Appeal Pre-Argument 
Statement) with the Clerk of the Court of Appeals. The following 
are filed with the Clerk at the same time: Form D (Transcript 
Information) and copies of the judgment, order or decision 
appealed from. CAMP R. 3 (as amended Nov. 10, 1986). 
(b) Staff counsel may direct the attorneys to attend a 
pre-argument conference to explore settlement possibilities, 
simplify the issues or discuss any matters related to the 
expeditious disposition of the appeal. CAMP R. 5. Guidelines 
for the conduct of pre-argument conferences have been adopted. 
Conference discussions are confidential and may not be 
communicated to any member of the Court. In re Lake Utopia 
Paper, Ltd., 608 F.2d 928 C2d Cir. 1979). 
(c) As soon as practicable, staff counsel will issue a 
scheduling order setting forth dates for the filing of the record 
on appeal, briefs and appendix, and designating the week during 
which the argument of the appeal will be heard. CAMP R. 4. The 
dates prescribed by the scheduling order do not necessarily 
conform to the filing dates set forth in the Fed. R. App. P. 
See, ~~ Fed. R. App. P. 3l(a) (time for filing brief). 
(d) Sanctions, including dismissal of the appeal, may 
be imposed for non-compliance with orders and directions issued 
pursuant to the Civil Appeals Management Plan. CAMP R. 7. 
4. Motions 
(a) The time and manner of making motions are governed 
by Local Rule 27. Notice of Motion Form T-1080 must be employed, 
and a copy of the lower court or agency decision must accompany 
the affidavits, memoranda of law and exhibits. 
(b) Substantive motions normally are heard by the 
regular panels sitting on Tuesday of each week, and oral argument 
is permitted. These motions include applications for dismissal 
or summary affirmance; summary enforcement of agency orders; stay 
or injunction pending appeal or review; and leave to proceed in 
forma pauperis. A single judge may hear substantive motions when 
the court is in recess. 
(c) On a motion for stay pending appeal, the moving 
party must demonstrate a substantial possibility of success on 
the merits, a likelihood of irreparable injury if the relief is 
not granted, and that the stay will not harm another party or the 
public interest. Dubose v. Pierce, 761 F.2d 913, 920 (2d Cir. 
1981). The application ordinarily is made to the District court 
in the first instance. Fed. R. App. P. 8. 
(d) Procedural motions generally are decided by a 
single judge. These motions include applications for 
consolidation; intervention~ substitution; extension of time to 
file briefs; leave to file amicus briefs~ filing oversized 
briefs1 extending time for a petition for rehearing and similar 
matters. 
IV. Appellate Advocacy 
1. The Brief 
(a) The Brief must contain, in the following order: 
(1) a table of contents, with page references, and a table of 
cases (alphabetically arranged), statutes and other authorities, 
referring to the page where they are cited; (2) a statement of 
the issues presented; (3) a statement of the nature of the case, 
the course of proceedings and the disposition below, followed by 
a statement of facts with references to the record; (4) an 
argument containing contentions, reasons and citations to 
authorities and the record; (5) a conclusion stating the relief 
sought. Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)-(c). Appellant's Brief must 
include, as a preliminary statement, the name of the Judge or 
agency member who rendered the decision and a citation to the 
opinion, if reported. 2d Cir. R. § 28. The form of the Brief is 
prescribed by Fed. R. App. P. 32 and 2d Cir. R. § 32. 
(b) Except by permission of the Court, principal Briefs 
cannot exceed 50 pages and Reply Briefs cannot exceed 25 pages, 
exclusive of pages containing the tables and any addendum 
containing statutes, rules and regulations. Fed. R. App. P. 
28(f), (g). Excessive footnoting should be avoided. 
(c) If pertinent authorities come to the attention of a 
party after the Brief is filed or after oral argument but before 
decision, that party should promptly advise the Court by letter, 
with a copy to opposing counsel, setting forth the citations. 
Fed. R. App. P. 28(j). 
(d) Parties should be referred to in the Brief by name 
or description rather than "appellant" or "appellee." Fed. R. 
App. P. 2 8 (d) • 
(e) Some deficiencies noted: excessive quotations of 
the record and authorities; inaccurate citations; typographical 
and grammatical errors; outdated authorities; disorganized 
arguments; failure to identify and distinguish adverse precedent; 
lack of clarity; prolix sentences; uninformative point headings; 
inadequate statement of the issues presented; incomplete factual 
presentation; statement of the facts through summary of witness' 
testimony rather than narrative; discussion of material outside 
the record; use of slang; inclusion of sarcasm, personal attacks 
and other irrelevant matters; excessive number of points; lack of 
reasoned argument; illogical and unsupportable conclusions; 
failure to meet adversary's arguments; failure to recognize that 
the purpose of the Brief is to persuade. See 2d Cir. R. § 28. 
2. The Appendix 
(a) The appellant is responsible for preparing and 
filing the Appendix to the Briefs. It must contain: (1) the 
docket entries in the proceeding below; (2) relevant portions of 
the pleadings, charge, findings or opinion; {3) the judgment, 
order or decision in question; (4) other parts of the record to 
which the parties wish to direct the Court's attention. 
Memoranda of law filed below should not be included. Fed. R. 
App. P. 30(a). The form of the Appendix is governed by Fed. R. 
App. P. 32. 
(b) The parties are encouraged to agree on the contents 
of the Appendix. If they cannot, the appellant must serve on the 
appellee a designation of the parts of the record to be included 
and a statement of the issues to be presented, within 10 days 
after the filing of the record. The appellee then must designate 
the portions of the record it desires to include, within 10 days 
thereafter, and the appellant must include the parts so 
designated. Fed. R. App. P. 30(b). 
(c) Unless the parties otherwise agree, the cost of 
producing the Appendix must be paid initially by appellant. If 
the appellant considers the items designated by appellee 
unnecessary, the appellee must be so advised and must then 
advance the costs of including those items. The cost of 
production is taxed as costs, except that the cost of producing 
unnecessary items may be imposed on the requesting party. Local 
Rules may provide for sanctions to be imposed upon "attorneys who 
unreasonably and vexatiously increase the costs of litigation 
through the inclusion of unnecessary material in the appendix." 
Fed. R. App. P. 30(b) (although the Second Circuit has not yet 
adopted such a rule, these sanctions have been imposed under the 
Court's inherent powers). 
(d) An alternative method, allowing for deferred 
preparation of the Appendix, is provided, and the Appendix may be 
dispensed with altogether in a limited class of cases. Fed. R. 
App. P. 30(c); 2d Cir. R. § 30. When exhibits are designated for 
inclusion, they may be bound in a separate volume, suitably 
indexed with a description of each exhibit. Fed. R. App. P. 
30(e); 2d Cir. R. § 30. 
(e) Preparation of an appropriate Appendix is an 
important factor in successful appellate advocacy. 
Underinclusion is just as serious a deficiency as overinclusion. 
Frequently, Briefs refer to matters in the record that are not 
included in the Appendix. This creates an unfavorable impression 
on the Court. 
3. Oral Argument 
(a) Although the Court is authorized to dispense with 
oral argument in certain cases, 2d Cir. R. § 34(g), the custom in 
the Second Circuit is to allow it whenever requested. Time 
requests are passed on by the presiding Judge, and the time 
currently allowed to each side averages 10-15 minutes. Appellant 
may reserve time for rebuttal. Argument is heard by a panel of 3 
Judges. Once a case is set for oral argument, there may be no 
continuance, except by order of the Court on good cause shown. 
Engagement of counsel (other than in the Supreme Court) is not 
good cause. Fed. R. App. P. 34; 2d Cir. R. § 34. 
(b) Oral argument is a very important element of 
appellate advocacy and should not be waived. It presents an 
important opportunity to persuade the Court. The Second Circuit 
is a "hot bench" and the Judges welcome the opportunity to 
clarify their thinking and that of their colleagues through the 
interchange with counsel. A Judge's tentative conclusions about 
a case have been "turned around" on many occasions by oral 
argument. 
(c) Some deficiencies noted: reading from a prepared 
text; quoting extensively from a case or from the record; 
deferring answers to questions; referring to the Brief rather 
than responding directly to the inquiry; unpreparedness; lack of 
familiarity with precedential cases decided since the filing of 
the Briefs; excessive discussion of the facts; lack of 
familiarity with relevant facts; unnecessary discussion of basic 
legal principles; unfamiliarity with cases cited; responding with 
a "guess"; lack of a structured argument; ineffective 
presentation of the issues; insufficient voice volume; 
distracting mannerisms; answering questions with questions~ 
attempting to cover too many points; emotional arguments. 
4. Sanctions 
(a) The prevailing party may be awarded just damages 
and double costs for delay or for a frivolous appeal. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1912~ Fed. R. App. P. 38. An attorney who multiplies the 
proceedings unreasonably and vexatiously may be liable for excess 
costs, expenses and attorney's fees attributable to such conduct. 
28 u.s.c. § 1927. 
(b) Sanctions, including dismissal, may be imposed for 
failure to comply with time limitations or any rule or order 
related to the appeal. 2d Cir. R. § 38; CAMP R. 7. The sanction 
provisions of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 apply to motions in the Court of 
Appeals as well as in the District Court. In re Martin-
Trigona, 795 F.2d 9, 12 C2d Cir. 1986). 
v. Decision Making 
1. Initial decision making 
(a) The average time for processing appeals in the 
Second Circuit is 6 months, the fastest in the nation. See 1986 
Report of the Second Circuit Executive. A decision may come in 
the form of a written opinion or a suoonary order. Decisions may 
be announced from the Bench, but such dispositions are rare, 
except in the case of argued motions. Summary orders are not 
formal opinions and are unreported. Since they are considered to 
serve "no jurisprudential purpose," they may not be cited or 
otherwise referred to in unrelated cases before the Second 
Circuit or any other court. 2d Cir. R. § 0.23. 
(b) Tentative votes are taken at conferences held 
immediately following oral argument or at the end of the week. 
Voting memoranda, giving reasons for the tentative votes, are 
exchanged in a number of cases. Writing assignments are made by 
the senior active Judge, unless that Judge dissents, in which 
case the assignment is made by the next senior active Judge. 
Drafts of opinions and summary orders undergo extensive review by 
panel members, and positions frequently are re-aligned. Summary 
orders generally are not used in cases of reversal, and any panel 
member may object to decision by summary order. 
(c) In arriving at a decision on a question of state 
law, the Second Circuit now may certify the question to the New 
York Court of Appeals. N.Y. Rules of Court§ 500.17 (N.Y. Ct. 
App.); see Kidney v. Kalmar Laboratories, Inc., 808 F.2d 955 (2d 
Cir. 1987}. Certification may be made by the court~ sponte or 
on motion. 2d Cir. R. § 0.27 (added Nov. 10, 1986). Acceptance 
of the question is discretionary with the New York Court. 
(d) Following receipt of the opinion or order, the 
clerk enters judgment and, on the same date, mails copies of the 
opinion or order to the parties. Fed. R. App. P. 36. The 
mandate issues 21 days thereafter, unless the time is shortened 
or enlarged by order. Fed. R. App. P. 41. The bill of costs 
must be filed within 14 days after judgment. Procedures relating 
to taxation of the bill of costs are set forth in Fed. R. App. P. 
39 and 2d Cir. R. § 39. 
2. Post-judgment decision making 
(a) The decision-making process may continue with a 
petition to the panel for rehearing, which must be filed within 
14 days after entry of judgment unless the time is shortened or 
enlarged by order. The petition must particularize the points of 
law or fact petitioner contends were overlooked or misapprehended 
in the opinion. Oral argument is not ordinarily permitted, and 
no answer to the petition will be received unless required by the 
Court. If a petition for rehearing is wholly without merit, a 
sum not exceeding $250 may be taxed as additional costs against 
the petitioner. Fed. R. App. P. 40; 2d Cir. R. § 40. 
(b) The petition for rehearing may also contain a 
"suggestion" for rehearing in bane. The vote of a majority of 
the Circuit Judges in regular active service is necessary to 
secure in bane consideration. An appeal or other proceeding may 
be heard in bane initially, but in bane hearings generally are 
disfavored. They are limited to cases where consideration by the 
full Court is necessary to maintain uniformity of decisions and 
where questions of exceptional importance are involved. Fed. R. 
App. P. 35; 2d Cir. R. § 35. 
(c) Issuance of the mandate is stayed upon timely 
filing of a petition for rehearing. If the petition is denied, 
the mandate issues 7 days thereafter. A further stay may be 
sought by motion on notice pending application for writ of 
certiorari to the u.s. Supreme Court. Fed. R. App. P. 41; 2d 
Cir. R. § 41. The pendency of a suggestion for a rehearing in 
bane does not automatically stay the mandate. Fed. R. App. P. 
35(c). 
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Chief Judge Munson of the Northern District, under whom I 
was privileged to serve as a District Judge, never has thought 
much of the appellate process. (I guess that no District Judge 
does). He says that appellate judges are like soldiers who come 
onto the battlefield after the battle and shoot the wounded. He 
claims that he read a dissenting opinion in my court that went 
something like this: "I dissent, substantially for the reasons 
given in the majority opinion." He also claims to have read a 
concurring opinion written in these words: "I concur in so much 
of the majority opinion as is supported by the reasoning therein 
and dissent from the remainder." Judge Munson told me that he 
heard about the argument of an appeal involving one of my 
decisions as a District Judge. The attorney for the appellant 
began: "May it please the court, this is an appeal from a 
decision by Judge Miner." The presiding judge supposedly said: 
"Get on to your next point." Speaking at the ceremony marking my 
departure from his District Court to serve as a Judge of the . 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Judge Munson was heard 
to remark that both courts undoubtedly would benefit from the 
event. 
Regardless of how district judges such as Judge Munson 
regard the appellate process, it is incumbent upon lawyers 
practicing in the Federal Courts in New York to become familiar 
with civil appellate practice in the Second Circuit. To that 
end, I have prepared the outline that appears in your coursebook. 
; 
I 
\ 
The outline is perhaps more detailed than necessary, but the 
materials are quite up to date and replace the more sketchy 
outline of this subject previously published by the State Bar. 
The outline covers a number of current issues and is divided into 
five parts: Appealability, at pages 285-289~ Scope of Review, at 
pages 289-291~ Mechanics of Appeal, at pages 291-294~ Appellate 
Advocacy, at pages 294-298 and Decisionmaking at pages 298-299. 
Also included is a list of Suggested References at page 300. 
My discussion this afternoon will focus on current and 
recurrent problems relating to two items covered in the outline: 
Appealability and Appellate Advocacy. With respect to the 
question of what is, and what is not appealable, there are sharp 
differences from New York State practice, and it behooves the 
practitioner to be familiar with those differences. With respect 
to appellate advocacy, it suffices at this point to say that I 
have been greatly disappointed in much of the written and oral 
argument recently presented to the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals during my sittings. By restricting my comments to these 
two topics, I hope to have some time for any questions you may 
have regarding civil appeals in the Second Circuit. 
Appealability. A number of judgments and orders brought 
before our Court are dismissed each year simply because they are 
not appealable. Very frequently, our staff counsel will bring to 
the attention of attorneys at a conference, held pursuant to our 
Civil Appeals Management Program, that a particular judgment or 
j 
\ 
order is non-appealable. I understand that this can be very 
embarrassing for the attorneys involved. Research into the 
question of appealability, before the notice of appeal is filed, 
is strongly recommended. In determining what is appealable, we 
frequently refer to the rule of finality. Does the rule require 
a decision to be final, to the extent of ending all phases of the 
litigation on the merits, before an appeal may be taken to the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals? The answer to that question is 
generally "yes," rarely "no" and sometimes "maybe." 
Generally, appellate review is not available until the final 
judgment, resolving all the claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, 
consolidated claims and defenses in a case is entered. 28 u.s.c. 
§ 1291 requires the prosecution in the Court of Appeals of all 
final decisions of the district courts. Let me give you some 
common examples of orders that are non-final and therefore not 
appealable: 
I 
I 
( 
d) RESULT OF NON-COMPLIANCE- Failure to timely file Forms 
C & D results in automatic dismissal of the appeal by 
the Clerk of the Court of Appeals. Upon a showing of 
good cause, accompanied by the required Forms, rein-
statement is usually granted, but counsel is advised 
to avoid the risk. 
B. Substantive Requirements 
1. Finality- 28 USC §1291, Rule 54(b), FRCP 
in general, a final judgment, completely resolving all 
of the claims raised in a single case or consolidated 
proceeding, must be ente~ed·before appellate review is 
available. Thus, if any claim, portion of a claim, 
counter-claim or cross-claim remains pending, a judg-
ment on any other claim is not considered "final." 
This federal rule of "finality" contrasts sharply with 
New York State court practice.· Under Rule 54(b) FRCP, 
a District Judge does have discretion to direct entry 
of judgme~t on a discrete claim, though not on a por-
tion of a single claim, see, Aetna Casualty & Surety 
Co. v. Giesow, 412 F. 2d 468, 470 (2d Cir. 1969); but 
the District Court must provide,_ in light of the strong 
policy against piecemeal appeals announced in Ansam v. 
COLA, 760 F. 2d 442 (2d Cir. 1985), a "brief, reasoned 
explanation" of why there is no "just reason for delay." 
NOTE: Interlocutory appellate review is available, by 
leave of court, under 28 USC §1292(b), to resolve con-
trolling questions of law, but leave to appeal must be 
obtained from both the District Court and the Court of 
Appeals. 
NOTE: In extraordinary (rare) circumstances, appellate 
review of non-final orders can be had via mandamus. 
V Listed below are examples of orders which have been 
'"-.• sidered to be non-final, and hence,_ not appealabl·e. 
- discovery orders. See, Xerox Corp. v. SCM Corp., 
534 F. 2d 1031 (2d Cir. 1976) 
con-
-an order granting a new trial. See, Compaenie Nat'! v. 
Port of N.Y. Authority, 427 F. 2d 951, 95 (Zd Cir. 1970) 
- an order dismissing a complaint with leave to replead 
or amend. See, Elfbein v. Gulf & Western, 590 F. 2d 
445, 448 (2d Cir. 1978) 
- an order denying a motion to dismiss a complaint or 
for summary judgment. See, Pacific Union Conference 
v. Marshall, 434 U.S. 1305, 1306 U977); Alart Assoc. 
v. Aptaker, 402 F. 2d 779 (2d Cir. 1968); RRI Realty 
v. Inc. Village of Southampton, 766 F. 2d 63 (2d Cir 1985) 
EXCEPTION: Rejection of a government official's defense 
I ( 
of absolute immunity or qualified immunity, on a legal ground 
as opposed to a factual basis, is appealable, because defendant 
is entitled to be free from suit:;"" not just liability in damages. 
See, Mitchell v. Forsyth, 105 S. Ct. 2806(1985). QUERY: Whether 
interlooA:ory review is available to defendant if plaintiff has 
sought both damages individually and equitable relief against 
the official in his official capacity. See, Bever v. Gilbertson, 
724 F. 2d 1083 (4th Cir. 1984)(no review); Schwartz, Public 
Interest Litigation -Appeals From'Denial Of Immunity, NYLJ 
Dec. 16, 1986. 
-an order_,finding liability only, reserving for future deter-.' 
mination the amount of damages:·l See, Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 
424 u.s. 737,744. . -
EXCEPTION - Ordering the delivery of real property, which can 
create an irreparable injury,,may be appealable. Compare, Forgay 
v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201, 204 (1848), with In Re Martin-
Trigona, 763 F. 2d 135 (2d Cir. 1985). 
-an order awarding interim attorneys' fee1. See, Hastings v. Maine-
Endwell, 676 F. 2d 893 (2d Cir. 1982); In Re Stable Mews Assoc., 
778 F. 2d .i21 (2d Cir. 1985). But see, Falvey, Significant Devel-
opments In The· Law, NYLJ May 29, 1986 (discussing Rule 11 cases 
in 7th cTr.and----o:-c. Cir.) 
- an order not followed by entry of a "judgment'J. See, Kanematsu- · 
Gosha v. M/T Messiniaki, F. Zd , 86-7610 (2d Cir. Nov. 7, 
1986). Under FRAP 4(a) (2)-;-a noticeCif appeal filed after announ-
cement of a decision, but before entry of judgment, is treated as 
filed on the date of the judgment. But make sure to get a j~dgment. 
-an order by a District Judge staying his own proceedingi. 
NOTE: lh Moses H. Cone Memoria 1 Hospi ta 1 v. Mercury Canst r. Co., 
460 U.S. 1, 11 n.ll (1983), the Courtheld that a stay order is 
final, and hence appealable, "when the sole purpose and effect 
of the stay are precisely to surrender jurisdictidn of~ federal 
court to state court.·" Thus, federal abstention in favor of state 
court adjudication, which effectively ensures under principles 
of res judicata, that there would be no further litigation in a 
federal forum, constitutes a surrender af jurisdiction which is 
appealable. In contrast, a decision not to abstain is not a · 
final, appealable decision. RRI Real~v. Inc. VillageCif South-
amption, 766 F. Zd 63 (2d Cir. 1985) 
-an order fully resolving the merits, but not resolving the issue 
of attorneys' fees, is not appealable in only two ins·tances: in 
a stockholder derivative-iction, where the fees come out of the 
common fund, see,_ Lewis v. S.L. & E Inc., 746 F. 2d 141 (Zd Cir. 
1984}; and where attorneys' fees are.contractually stipulated, 
see, Krear v. Nineteen Named Trustees, 77h F. Zd 1563 (Zd Cir. 
1985). In all other instances, where fees are based upon a fee-
shifting statute, or Rule 11, or upon inherent authority upon a 
finding of "bad faith", a timely notice of appeal from judgment 
on the merits must be filed even though fees remain unresolved. 
See, White v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 445, 452 n.14 (1982); 
Ellender v. Schweiker, 781 F. 2d 314 (Zd Cir. 1986). 
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During my tenure as a New York State Supreme Court Justice, 
I found that a plaintiff had taken the trouble to appeal an order 
of mine directing compliance with one item in a bill of 
particulars. Aside from the fact that there are no bills of 
particulars in federal practice, such an appeal would be 
impermissible under our appellate procedure. As I have indicated 
previously, however, there are some limited exceptions to the 
rule of finality. 28 U.S.C. § 1292Ca) provides a statutory 
appeal as of right from interlocutory orders granting or denying 
injunctions, appointing receivers and determining rights and 
liabilities in admiralty cases. The right to appeal from a grant 
or denial of an injunction order is a little tricky. For 
example: While an order compelling or denying arbitration is 
appealable as a final decision under § 1291, an order granting or 
refusing a stay of arbitration proceedings is not considered a 
grant or denial of injunction under§ 1292(a). An order refusing 
to stay proceedings in the district court pending arbitration is 
considered an appealable interlocutory order refusing an 
injunction, if the underlying action is legal, rather than 
equitable, in nature. Here is a recent cite on that: Gilmore v. 
Shearson-American Express, 811 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1987). Very 
recently, we held that preliminary relief afforded by the 
district court under the provisions of a statute was not an 
injunction of the type contemplated by§ 1292(a). Only orders 
issued pursuant to the equity powers of the district court 
qualify. The case is Korea Shipping Corp. v. New York Shipping 
Association, 811 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1987). 
A fairly sure-fire way to avoid the rule of finality is to 
get the district judge to direct the entry of a partial judgment 
-- that is a final judgment affecting one or more but fewer than 
all of the claims or parties. I say fairly sure-fire because you 
must have the district judge make an express determination that 
there is no just reason for delay and expressly direct the entry 
of the partial judgment. The district judge must say why there 
is no just reason for delay, and we may refuse to accept the case 
for review if the explanation given is lacking in the necessary 
detail. We do apply a light standard of review to these partial 
judgment certifications, however, -- abuse of discretion. The 
entire process is governed by the provisions of Rule 54(b) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A very recent decision of ours 
involving the standards for Rule 54(b) certification is Cullen v. 
Margiotta, 811 F.2d 698, 710-712 (2d Cir. 1987), decided in 
February. 
A much less certain way to gain review of a non-final order 
is found in the certification procedure set out at 28 U.S.C. § 
1292(b). To utilize that procedure, the district judge must 
determine that the order involves a "controlling question of law 
as to which there is substantial ground for difference of 
opinion" and "an immediate appeal from the order may materially 
advance the ultimate termination of the litigation." As is 
apparent, only a novel question of law is adequate to invoke this 
procedure and then only if the conclusion of the litigation can 
be hastened by resolution of that question. The certification is 
subject to acceptance by the Court of Appeals, and acceptance is 
rare. As a district judge, I invoked the statute but once, and 
the question was rejected by the Circuit Court. 
Reviewable collateral orders of the type discribed in Cohen 
v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., are few and far between. 
Such orders must satisfy a three-fold test: They must 
conclusively determine a disputed question, resolve an important 
issue completely separate from, and collateral to, the merits of 
the case, and be effectively unreviewable on appeal. Courts are 
reluctant to find all three conditions satisfied. Cohen itself 
involved an order waiving the posting of security for costs. 
While the Cohen collateral order exception to the rule of 
finality was judicially created about forty years ago, another 
exception has only recently been engrafted on the rule by the 
courts. The new exception allows immediate appeal from the 
denial of motions to dismiss or for summary judgment in civil 
rights claims against public officers who have raised the defense 
of absolute or qualified immunity. 42 u.s.c. § 1983 allows 
claims against those who, acting under color of state law, 
deprive a person of a right, privilege or immunity guaranteed by 
the Constitution or by a statute of the United States. A 
defendant who raises the claim of absolute immunity, such as a 
judge (I have been sued several times by disgruntled litigants) 
is considered entitled to have the rejected defense determined on 
appeal immediately to avoid the inconvenience of trial, if 
possible. Likewise, those who have the defense of qualified 
immunity, such as police officers who claim to have acted in good 
faith, may have appeals from denials of this defense heard 
immediately if the resolution of factual issues is not required. 
For example, if a police officer conducted a search in a 
generally judicially-approved manner thereafter held to be 
unconstitutional, it might be said that there was a good faith, 
qualified immunity defense as a matter of law. 
While all orders denying intervention (of right or 
permissive) are appealable in the Second Circuit, the Supreme 
Court held a few weeks ago that an order denying intervention of 
right but granting permissive intervention subject to conditions 
is not appealable. 
An arcane rule to bear in mind is the rule of pendent 
appellate iurisdiction. This rule has nothing to do with state 
claims appended to federal claims as in the pendent jurisdiction 
of a district court. It deals with our exercise of jurisdiction 
over an otherwise non-appealable order which appears in the 
record before us along with an appealable order. A note of 
caution: Pendent appellate jurisdiction is purely discretionary, 
and I was a member of a recent panel that exercised its 
discretion to reject the pendent question. 
I think that I have hit most of the highlights of 
appealability and do wish to move on to appellate advocacy. I 
refer you to the outline for the rules on appealability of 
judgments entered by magistrates (some new provisions here), 
district court judgments in bankruptcy matters, agency and tax 
court decisions and post-judgment motions. Just a word with 
respect to post-judgment motions: While timely motions for 
judgment n.o.v., for amendment of the court's findings, and for 
new trial or amendment of judgment stop the time for appeal from 
running until they are decided and are not separately appealable, 
a direct appeal may be taken from a decision on a motion for 
relief from a judgment or order brought under Rule 60 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Now to Advocacy. A few years ago, then Chief Justice Burger 
made some comments about the low state of trial advocacy in the 
United States. I don't know how he came to the conclusions he 
did, because the court he was sitting on does not have a very 
good view of trials. From my own experience on the trial bench, 
New York State Supreme Court and United states District Court, 
trial lawyers generally do an adequate, often an outstanding job, 
in representing their clients at the trial level. My experience 
has been much different as an appellate judge. Frankly, I am 
amazed at the poor quality of the briefs and oral arguments I 
frequently am confronted with at the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals. It is with a great deal of self-interest, therefore, 
that I share with you some observations, warn you of some 
pitfalls and offer you some suggestions respecting appellate 
advocacy in the Second Circuit. 
First, the Brief. In the beginning of the Republic, the 
Brief was merely an adjunct to unlimited oral argument. I was 
able to get some of the flavor of those times when I sat with a 
Court of Appeal in England. The briefs there were not much more 
than a list of applicable precedents and authorities, but the 
oral argument proceeded at a leisurely pace, with many questions 
and answers. The sheer bulk of cases makes it impossible to 
proceed before our Court in this manner. Appellate argument is 
strictly limited, and it is important that the Brief be as 
persuasive as possible. It should never be forgotten that the 
purpose of all appellate advocacy is to persuade. 
Just this past week, I read two Briefs that provided a study 
in contrasts. One brief included six separate points, each point 
written on one page. There were no citations of authority in any 
one of the points. The other Brief was chock-full of citations 
citations to Supreme Court cases, Circuit Court cases and even 
to some state cases. Each and every one of the citations was 
totally unrelated to the case on appeal. Try to give some 
authorities in the Brief, but make sure they're in point. 
Every once in a while, we find a Brief containing a fine 
argument, supported by law and logic, on some arcane point of law. 
Unfortunately, we can't consider the point, because it was not 
raised below. An issue not raised in the district court cannot 
considered in the Court of Appeals. Grace Towers Tenants 
Association v. Grace Housing Development Fund, 538 F.2d 491, 495 
(2d Cir. 1976). The principal was reiterated in a decision 
issued by a panel of my court two weeks ago. Christensen v. 
Kiewit-Murdock Investment Corp., No. 85-7964, slip opinion 
decision March 26, 1987. These two citations probably should be 
added to the Scope of Review section of my outline (Part IIJ. No 
matter how good the point is, don't include it in the Brief if it 
isn't raised at the trial level. 
There is no reason to present a Brief loaded with inaccurate 
citations, typographical and grammatical errors and citations to 
outdated authorities. Yet we frequently see Briefs containing 
one or more of these deficiencies, any one of which will cause 
the Brief writer to lose credibility with the court. The 
standard format of a Brief is prescribed by the Federal Rules of 
Appellate Procedure and the Rules of our Circuit, and we insist 
on strict adherence to that format. Failure to adhere to the 
format may be cause for rejection of the Brief in the Clerk's 
office or by the staff attorneys. If a Brief in improper form 
gets past them, it will certainly lose you points with the panel 
hearing your case. 
Principal Briefs cannot exceed fifty pages and reply Briefs 
cannot exceed twenty-five pages. We adhere strictly to those 
requirements, although there is such a thing as a motion to file 
an oversized Brief. We take a dim view of those who attempt to 
increase the number of words in the Brief by extensive use of 
footnoting. Avoid this annoyance! 
We don't look for a prize-winning literary style in a Brief. 
We do expect clarity, well-organized argument and understandable 
sentence structure. All too often we find rambling narratives, 
repetitive discussions and conclusions unsupported by law or 
logic. A Brief is different from most other forms of writing in 
that it has as its only purpose the persuasion of the reader. 
This should be borne in mind at all times. 
The statement of facts is a very critical part of the Brief. 
It should not be incomplete, nor should it be too lengthy. It 
should cover only those facts necessary to the development of the 
legal issues in the case. A bad habit of some lawyers is to list 
the name of each witness, followed by a summary of his or her 
testimony. A narrative of the facts is much preferred. 
In the narrative of the facts, as well as in other portions 
of the Brief, it often is necessary to refer to testimony or 
exhibits. The testimony or exhibits referred to should be 
included in the Appendix. Make sure that they are included! 
There is nothing quite so frustrating to me as to find some 
reference in the Brief to a piece of evidence that is not 
included in the Appendix. I must then go to the original record 
in our clerk's office or possibly back to the district court 
clerk's office to find what I am looking for. The form and 
development of the Appendix is discussed in the outline under 
Appellate Advocacy for a good reason. I urge you to study it 
well! 
I think that an excessive number of points weakens the 
brief, just as the use of slang, sarcasm, personal attacks, and 
other irrelevant matters weaken the brief. Choose three or four 
or five strong points, preface them with concise point headings 
and proceed to argue how the court below erred. Support your 
conclusions with appropriate authorities and reasoned arguments. 
Meet your adversary's argument head-on, describe where you agree 
and where you differ, and if you are short on authority for some 
point you are making, say so. Weave the facts of your case into 
the law cited in your points, using sentences having subjects and 
verbs, and you'll have the makings of a winning brief • 
. ,< Oral Arg)lll(ent. Good appellate advocacy requires good oral 
argument as well as good briefing. It's always amazing to me 
/ that an attorney, offered a change to argue, prefers to submit. 
On many occasions, my preliminary thinking about a case has been 
turned around by oral argument. Our custom is to allow oral 
argument whenever requested, and I urge you to accept the 
opportunity it offers to persuade the Court to decide in your 
favor. Although the time allowed for oral presentation is short, 
customarily ten or fifteen minutes, it can be used to good 
advantage. 
The Second Circuit is a red-hot bench. Each member of the 
panel hearing oral argument has read the briefs, and sometimes 
there has been an exchange of memoranda among the Judges prior to 
the courtroom presentation. The Judges therefore generally come 
to the oral argument with a tentative view of the outcome of the 
case. Many of my colleagues have told me that their tentative 
views also have been discarded as the result of oral argument. 
Because of our familiarity with the case, there often is a 
lively exchange of questions and answers between court and 
counsel in the Second Circuit. It is not unusual for the entire 
time allowed for argument to be taken up in this manner. The 
exchange is important, because the Judges use it to resolve their 
doubts, clarify their thinking, and, if you watch closely, 
sometimes to argue with each other. X I rge you to respond 
./ 
directly to any question asked. Neve'r say "I'll get to that, 
_,// 
your Honor." I've heard that ~onse from several attorneys who 
never did get around to answ~ing the question. 
Attorneys sometimes react to questions from the bench in 
strange ways. One responded to a question by a colleague of 
mine as follows: "Why did you ask that question, your Honor?" 
Obviously, one should not answer a question with a question. I 
am told that the following answer came in response to a question 
by a Judge in the Eighth Circuit: "You wouldn't want to know 
( 
that, your Honor." That didn't go over too well, either. 
Sometimes an attorney will not know the answer to a question from 
the bench. Don't "wing it!" Say you don't know and offer to 
furnish the answer after argument in accordance with Rule 28(j) 
of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
One of the rules of the Supreme Court says something to the 
effect that the reading of an argument is discouraged. It is a 
waste or time to read your argument in the Second Circuit as well. 
It is too distracting, precludes eye contact with the Judges, and 
deprives you of the necessary flexibility to answer questions 
from the bench. Recently, a young attorney read his entire 
argument at such a rapid pace that we were loath to interrupt 
with a question, for fear he would lose his place. During the 
argument, one of my senior colleagues passed me a note in which 
he wrote: "Isn't this Godawful?" My own impression is that its 
a good idea to write out a beginning sentence, an ending sentence 
and to set up an outline of everything you want to cover in 
between. 
The key to effective argument is, of course, preparedness. 
I have found the best appellate oral argument in law school moot 
court competitions, and that is because the students spend hours 
and hours working under supervision on their Briefs and their 
oral presentations. Practicing attorneys seldom have the luxury 
of that much preparation. However, it frequently seems to me 
that almost no effort has gone into preparation for oral argument. 
( 
I know that some of the larger firms set up an in-house appellate 
bench for a moot argument before the real thing. A law school 
professor I recently met at a moot court competition told me that 
she was hired by lawyers from time to time to assist them in 
preparing for oral argument. In the final analysis, familiarity 
with the facts of your case, as well as familiarity with all the 
applicable law, is essential for effective oral argument. A few 
months ago, we heard oral argument from an attorney who was 
unfamiliar with a new Supreme Court case that was dispositive of 
the matter he was arguing. The Supreme Court decision had been 
issued after the Briefs in his case were filed. A brief trip to 
the Lexis machine prior to his appearance in our Court could have 
saved him a lot of embarrassment. 
Since we do have a hot bench, extensive quotations from the 
record or from the authorities is to be avoided. It is a waste 
of valuable time. Also wasteful are discussions of basic legal 
principles. Get right to the heart of the case -- the disputed 
issues. The Judges will do it if you don't. At the same time, 
you should remember that an attempt to cover too many points may 
indicate that you don't have any really strong points. 
Nature has provided some people with strong or pleasant 
voices. Neither is necessary to present an effective oral 
argument. However, the presentation must be loud enough so we 
don't have to strain to hear it. The words should be clearly 
enunciated, and the presentation should be slow enough for us to 
follow it. There is a microphone in our courtroom and a podium 
that adjusts up and down for height. Lack of height and weakness 
of voice therefore are not handicaps in the Second Circuit Court 
of Appeals. However, the attorney must talk directly into the 
microphone and not move away from it. Distracting mannerisms 
should be avoided, and emotionalism should be eschewed at all 
costs. You are not talking to a jury when you argue to us. 
Finally, be mindful of the tenth commandment promulgated by John 
w. Davis, one of the greatest appellate advocates of all times. 
As a matter of fact, I now obey that tenth commandment, which is 
this: "When you are finished, sit down." 
